In 1985 the Patriotic Union (UP) political party was established as a result of negotiations between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the administration of President Belisario Betancur. This party sought to become the first true representation of the political left in Colombia[1], a condition of the FARC’s commitment to gradually demobilise. In 2002 the UP was forced to withdraw from the electoral process after what many Colombians consider a political genocide: 5,000 of its members were assassinated in 17 years of existence, among them two presidential candidates, eight members of Congress, 70 council members and dozens of mayors.[2]

Between 1998 and 2002 the government of Andrés Pastrana held extensive peace negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the FARC. As an incentive for negotiations with the FARC, the government ceded a large area of land in the department of Caquetá that would later give the process its name: Caguán. Political analysts concur that this process failed because there was no real intention on the part of either side to arrive at a mutual agreement. While Pastrana, whether for lack of ability or will, did not put an end to the growing wave of paramilitary groups coming to power in the country, the FARC took advantage of the process to reorganise and reinforce their war strategies.[3]

The failure of the Caguán process laid the groundwork for the ascendance of Álvaro Uribe Vélez to the presidency. Uribe dedicated his energy to advancing a process of negotiations with the paramilitaries that produced legal framework for their demobilization. The so-called Justice and Peace Law (Law 975 of 2005) sought to regulate conditions for demobilisation and reinsertion of paramilitaries into society, guaranteeing relatively light sentences in exchange for information about the crimes they committed. According to Human Rights Watch, the demobilisation process did not produce satisfactory results because the government failed to take basic measures to verify the identity of those who demobilised, nor did it take advantage of the opportunity to question them regarding criminal networks and the material goods stolen. As a result, fraudulent demobilisation processes occurred in several regions, and parts of the groups continued to operate.[4]